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ARTICLE

The discourse of security in development policies: A genealogical approach to “Security Sector Reform”

Pénélope Larzillière

Institute for Research on Development (IRD), Ceped (Université Paris Cité IRD), Paris

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Abstract

Security is one of the objectives that has become associated with development policies. This article offers a genealogical perspective on this shift, focusing on the introduction of “Security Sector Reform” (SSR) into development policy as an apparatus with a two- fold normative process. The first point of note is the securitization of development policy. This pertains both to the discourse elements of the apparatus— here, the effects of the use of security semantics—and to its political technologies, with an SSR apparatus which can function as a new label for military co-o peration. This has led to new approaches in societies where this has taken place, with threat a key focus. There has also been a process of depoliticization in the wake of technical, standardized approaches. This has sidelined debate on the norms and political choices involved, albeit implicitly. Secondly, one can observe structural ambivalences in the field, chiefly on the issue of the state and the normative contradictions of a policy to strengthen “fragile states” that relies on external intervention in national politics. The case study of Lebanon complements this analysis, highlighting the structural tensions between the various aims of SSR, and how this affects local ownership: both the perception and reception of SSR are marked by power relationships which translate into hegemonic and counter- hegemonic labelling.

KEYWORDS

apparatus, genealogy, Lebanon, security and development, security sector reform

The rapprochement between development and security policies in the West is far from being a recent phenomenon. Its evolution is visible on the ground and, rather than being incidental, is the consequence of the end of the Cold War and subsequent structural changes in the nature and scale of conflicts. The “new wars” of the 1990s, and especially the experience of international intervention in the Balkans, have spurred the development of an integrated approach to security that is open to including both civil and military components (Kaldor, 1999). This link can be seen in the conception and the implementation of these policies; integrating development and security actors into a single political structure is believed to strengthen the efficiency of both sectors, particularly in post- conflict situations. The “security-development nexus” has thus been championed, and the idea that there can be no development without security (nor security without development) has been directly fostered by key Western organizations such as the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) (which has stated, “There is widespread recognition that there can be no security without development, and no development without security” (OECD, 2011, p. 6)), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) as well as the United Nations¹ and the World Bank.²

We will address this evolution from a genealogical perspective, focusing on the introduction of SSR policies to development. The genealogical approach is first and foremost discursive and reconsiders definitions—in this instance, security in development—in order to offer historical and political context and to open critical distance. It is based on Foucauldian theory³ and examines the power relationships underpinning the types of discourse, strategies and objectives that are at work, in order to bring tensions and debates to the surface.³ They also question the (possibly at times unintended) impact of these definitions, particularly their material effects. Such an approach has been adopted in critical development research based on the work of Arturo Escobar,⁴ but has yet to be directly applied to SSR. Indeed, while there has been abundant critical literature on SSR, this has primarily been internal

¹ In October 2005, the resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly relating to the 2005 World Summit Outcome stated, “We recognize that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing” (UN, 2005, p. 2). It has been restated in 2010. Resolution 65/1, *Keeping The Promise: United to achieve the Millennium Development Goals* of the General Assembly, §13.

² “There is a growing international policy consensus that addressing violent conflict and promoting economic development both require deeper understanding of the close relationship among politics, security, and development” (World Bank, 2011, p. 185).

³ Michel Foucault sets out several types of genealogy. In his founding text of 1971 he draws on Nietzschean genealogy, which is above all related to questioning knowledge and truth (Foucault, 1994) but he then reapplies it in relation to power: the genealogy of security mechanisms, the genealogy of the state and the technology of power (Foucault, 2004). This second definition is paramount for our purposes and is interpreted quite freely, drawing on its use in articulation with that of an apparatus (see footnote 8 below). The third type of genealogy Michel Foucault identifies concerns morality (Foucault, Dreyfus, & Rabinow, 2001).

³ An important point for Michel Foucault, who opposes any teleological approach and stresses “the discord and the disparate” (Foucault, 1994).

⁴ Arturo Escobar (1984) studies development discourse by building on Foucault’s theories of knowledge/power relations and concepts of archaeology and genealogy. For a recent analysis of how these concepts have been used in critical development studies see Mezzadra, Reid, and Samaddar (2013); for a specific genealogy of the notion of governance in development, see M.- C. Smouts (1998), and on empowerment see A.- E. Calvès (2009).

analysis: the difficulties and failures of SSR are debated from within its definitional frame, and recommendations are made.

The SSR label is used as a concept or heuristic tool to describe a situation (for example the state of the security sector in a given country and to what extent it meets SSR objectives). From conception to implementation, the political genealogy of these terms looks beyond this framework in order to critically reassess the political conditions of their conception and the norms inherent to them.

This analysis will reconsider the political genealogy of SSR by discussing its definitional and institutional implications. It will then make a study of the apparatus for setting SSR policies up and their reception, using available studies and a specific qualitative field research carried out in Lebanon with SSR stakeholders, non-governmental organization (NGO) and international organization members concerned with security and development policy.⁵ While a certain general strategic direction can be seen, tensions emerge within these apparatuses and, moreover, the reception of these policies has been far from unilateral: disjunctions arise with reappropriations, misappropriations, delegitimizations and oppositions. The analysis of these leads us to a dual hypothesis. First, despite the initial objective of shifting security towards development, the introduction of the term into development policies, even with a changed definition, has had paradoxical effects that can be as much linked to geopolitics (notably, its inscription in North–South power relations) as to security semantics itself. These semantics have a specific load, referring to ideas of threat and fear, which provide distances from the field of “ordinary politics” (Buzan, 2004, 2007). Arturo Escobar (1984) has shown how development discourse has constructed a certain reality by redefining certain countries as “other” and underdeveloped, to be dealt with and reformed through development policies. The inclusion of the reference to security dramatizes this reading by constructing these others as endangered, but also as dangerous. This reinforces the infiltration of development policies by security approaches, rather than the reverse, raises questions of securitization and the radicalization of development (Duffield, 2002), and on how, in the security-development approach, “the South is conceived as an international threat” (Lazell, 2016). Second, the contradictions and limitations of SSR noted on the ground have been far from a passing phenomenon and are based in structural ambivalences dating back to its conception, mainly pertaining to the issue of the state. Indeed, while the definition of security refers to the individual, it is in fact linked to political will to support so-called “weak” or “fragile” states whose instability is a concern to Western countries (Abrahamsen, 2016; Albrecht, Stepputat, & Andersen, 2010; Gordon, 2014; Sedra (Ed.), 2010). But, the will to strengthen these countries has also meant—somewhat paradoxically—that former components of national sovereignty have been transferred into international policies.

2 | SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: A POLITICAL GENEALOGY

“Security” has essentially been integrated into development policies by reconceptualizing the term so that it is distanced from conventional, state-focused definitions of security (Vale, 2005). Championing

⁵ The qualitative field study was carried out in November–December 2010, November 2011 and May 2012 in Lebanon. Semi-directive interviews were carried out with foreign and Lebanese SSR stakeholders in Lebanon (civil and military), NGOs, association and international organization members concerned with security and development policy. When available, documents they produced on the topic have been collected. Quoted interviews have been anonymized.

“human security” can be viewed as a political synthesis of these new approaches to security, in an extension of post- Westphalian perspectives that take the individual as the frame of reference. Risk evaluation no longer only—nor mainly—pertains to interstate conflict but takes states’ potential to threaten their own populations into account.⁶ Prior focuses on military and territorial concerns are challenged. The championing of a new security agenda is politically linked to its post- Cold War context. The demise of the main military threat was seen as an opportunity to transfer funds that had previously been allocated to military purposes into development (Ewan, 2007). Human security has thus become a priority: not only to keep people alive, but also to ensure them adequate living standards. Development objectives such as the fight against poverty have thus come to be included on the security agenda. Security sector reform relies on these new, more “people-centred” definitions of security and has thus been integrated into development policy. But it is also a working policy that is under implementation in many countries, far more so than human security. The definitions at stake are transcribed in policies contributing to the creation of an apparatus that incorporates ideas, practices and political technologies.⁷

The history of the introduction of SSR is characterized by its governmental and institutional approach. It involves working towards redefining security, in a way that allows development goals also to be framed in terms of security, as such making them a greater priority in the face of key defence players. Thus, the first institutional actor to officially make it a priority was a development actor, DFID, in 1998, and these origins can largely be analysed in terms of positioning and power relations between this department and the Defence Ministry and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Châtaigner, 2006; Lebœuf, 2005). Adopting the semantics of security gives development policies fresh urgency, while validating the implementation of the security/development nexus. It was based on a dual process of first broadening the definition of security and distancing it from the referent of the state, while secondly stressing a link between poverty and conflict. The argument that security cannot come without development, with poverty as a supposed risk factor, took on new significance after 2001. It then came to be understood within the framework of an internationalization of threat and a “focus on global interconnectedness” (Abrahamsen, 2016, p. 282). In strategic terms, development is no longer simply a matter of “winning hearts,” but of limiting globalized threat resulting from conflict, which this viewpoint claims could stem from poverty.⁸ In that context, there has been an observable convergence of Western bilateral and multilateral donors over the integration of security programmes, spearheaded by DFID and the OECD, with the creation of targeted units and dedicated flows of resources. The OECD adopted SSR in 2001, viewing DFID as a leader on the question (OECD, 2007b) and giving it central importance, with the ongoing development of guidelines (OECD, 2001, 2005a, 2007a, 2011). In 2001 the UNDP set up the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery—which

⁶ As stressed in the UNDP *Human development report* (1994), in the report of the Commission on Human Security (2003) and in the *War and Peace in the 21st Century* report of the Human Security Centre (2005), led by Andrew Mack and Zoe Nielsen. See also St. Marie, Standon, and Naghshpour (2008) and Ewan (2007). In the UNDP’s *Human development report* (1994, p. 23), human development is defined as “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.”

⁷ Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of the notion of apparatus or *dispositif* (without going into governmentality and biopower, which here would seem to involve an overly integrated and unilateral reading of these policies—essentially in terms of subjugation) allows us to conceive of combined heterogeneous elements: discourse, laws, institutions, etc., all while querying how they form a matrix and what their strategic function is (Foucault, 2001).

⁸ This example also shows how the perception of general risk leads to de facto globalization, as analysed by Beck (2007).

included SSR programmes—while NATO, the World Bank and the EU also promoted them. It has been a key component of the EU's defence and foreign security policy in a security–development–good governance paradigm. The EU is now the key player on this issue in terms of financial resources and dedicated staff, despite the absence of a genuine common policy and incidents of competition on the ground between European states (Dursun- Özkanca, 2014). In 2004, USAID endorsed an OECD Policy Brief on Security System Reform and governance (OECD, 2004) on behalf of the US government, and in 2009 it co-p ublished guidelines with the US Department of Defense on the implementation of SSR (Department of State, Department of Defense, & USAID, 2009). USAID's positioning is, moreover, comparable, to that of DFID earlier, as here too the agency was negotiating for its “institutional survival” through its involvement in the bid to eliminate the roots of terrorism (Makki, 2005).

The work to reframe security that allowed SSR to be integrated into development policies is partly in evidence in the definitions of SSR. Thus, for the OECD, “SSR programming aims to support countries in the development of more effective, efficient, and accountable justice systems” and to do so “in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance and the rule of law” (OECD, 2005a, 2007, as cited in OECD, 2011, p. 15). For USAID, “SSR is an umbrella term that might include integrated activities in support of: defence and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice; police; corrections; intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); and/or reduction of armed violence” (Department of State, Department of Defense, & USAID, 2009, p. 2).

The focus is on military and police forces since, in general, SSR has three main spheres of action: democratic control, professionalization and capacity building, and international and regional security co- operation, but an explicit link is made to human security.

The OECD lists civil society as one of the nine sub- sectors of the security system⁹ and proposes that SSR programmes “carefully identify the security needs of the people in a society ... and what is required to meet those needs” (OECD, 2011, p. 15). In this conception, SSR is not focused on the protection of the state and military threats (Sayigh, 2007). This outlook takes broader security issues into account and is also concerned with liberal values and allowing “people – including poor people – to expand their options in life” (Brzoska, 2003, p. 4). This was one of the official objectives intended to soften development donors’ objections to the label and its focus on security (Brzoska, 2003). Hence, broadening the definition of security has been a prerequisite for its inclusion in development policies. The wide spectrum opened up by this definition can also be understood as a strategic factor. Charles Saliba- Couture (2012), who undertook a systemic analysis of official DFID written speeches between 1997 and 2012, has described this consensual definitional ambiguity as “one of the strategies upon which UK DFID's institutional survival depends.” The heteroglossia of the notion has become an instrument of political consensus, allowing diverse actors with different interests to be brought together.

One can note the definitional ambiguity to the notion of security that has been integrated into development, and a certain disparity in the policies that have been set up under this label. This has led some analysts to favour the notion of “assemblage” over “apparatus” (Doucet, 2016). But the

⁹ “The security system is comprised of nine sub- s ectors: accountability and oversight; defence; intelligence and security service; integrated border management; police; justice; private security and military companies; and civil society” (OECD, 2011, p. 15).

implementation of SSR as apparatus, with the inclusion of a lexical field, ideas and active policies, has de facto resulted in a clear shift in the design of development policies. This change has commonly been analysed by critical theories in terms of the securitization and the radicalization of development. Such a shift can be seen in the evolution of semantics and discourses: it has now become possible to directly identify security as a development goal. The figures have also shifted, and certain security policies can now be financed through development funds via the SSR label. In 2004, official development assistance (ODA) was redefined to include SSR (OECD, 2005b) with the creation of the “Conflict, Peace and Security” sector code. This shift then became noticeable with the sharp increase in ODA funds from both multilateral and bilateral donors for security and development. From 2004 to 2014, official development assistance for conflict, peace and security from development assistance committee (DAC) member countries tripled (from 813 million to 2.5 billion, with a peak in 2009 and 2010 with 3.2 billion USD),¹⁰ while multilateral ODA increased sevenfold (from 106 to 790 million US dollars, with a peak in 2011 and 2013 at 1.1 billion dollars) (OECD, n.d.). UN reports in 2008 and 2013 highlighted SSR as key to security and development. Since 2009, the UN has implemented policies using a specially created SSR Unit (UN, 2013).

However, despite this clear shift, the process has not been without friction. Nor has its implementation been linear. The heteroglossia of the notion of security as it is conceived within SSR, together with certain development actors’ strategic interests, have not meant that integrating SSR into ODA has been free from debate. Such tensions are also connected to the connotations surrounding security semantics. Irrespective of which definitions are adopted, these connotations affect how the policies are perceived. Members of Western development institutions have expressed reservations (Howell & Lind, 2009; Swiss, 2011) owing to concerns that, regardless of their agenda, the blatant blurring between security issues and security actors could hinder rather than help their own work. Development and humanitarian actors have worried that their “neutral” image might be compromised, leading to growing rejection of their work on the ground. Western NGOs are liable to be targeted and perceived as just one of many agents of an imperialist agenda (Larzillièr & Micheletti, 2010). And the operational promotion of a development and security nexus also brings out disparities between development and security actors, and the power relations that take shape around questions of leadership. Defence ministries in Western countries have taken the view that association with development could hamper their efficiency (Brzoska, 2003) and, conversely, the potential military leadership of civil development operations is controversial (Gaulme, 2004). It has proved difficult in the operation of SSR to set up partnerships between security actors and development actors.

3.1 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AS POLITICAL TECHNOLOGIES: IMPLEMENTATION PROCESSES AND STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES

SSR has developed out of a strategic approach that has partly been based in redefining security, moving towards active policies and applying broadly standardized technological policies across a range of countries. In this sense, it has been transforming into an “apparatus.” These processes of implementation run into various difficulties, which are usually analysed and handled through remedial

¹⁰ The OECD’s DAC has 24 members: the European Union and 23 countries historically considered as main donor countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States).

recommendations based on the SSR objectives. Our purposes here are different. We will approach the difficulties encountered as structural rather than situational. They are less about obstacles on the ground than about how the diversity of the objectives included within the SSR label come to light during the implementation process, as well as their internal contradictions. Although definitional ambiguities can hold together diverse policy orientations, the way these are translated into an apparatus highlights how difficult it is to co-ordinate diverse objectives that turn out to be less complementary than they seemed to be at first glance.

On the ground, two different sorts of policy fall under this broad heading: professionalizing and reinforcing the efficiency of the armed forces and the police, and the democratic control and accountability of these forces (Chanaa, 2002). These two components rarely connect in practice. This is partly due to the diversity of the bilateral and multilateral actors involved in this implementation. Bilateral military co-operation, as expected, focuses on professionalism, which is reframed in terms of SSR. Furthermore, foundations such as the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) and networks such as the Arab Reform Initiative have endeavoured to promote democratic control and to open up discussions on these issues in the public sphere in an appeal to civil society. Finally, as far as the major agencies promoting SSR are concerned, including DFID, the OECD and the UN in East Timor, while both components feature on the design level for SSR, the situation on the ground has been one of gradual disengagement, even among development agencies, from the civil and democratic components of reform in favour of reinforcing the state and its police and armed forces (Baker, 2011; Baker & Scheye, 2007; Caparini, 2010; Gordon, 2014; Sedra, 2007). Scaling-down has also been noticeable in the case of the EU. For example, the EU SSR policy in the Palestinian territories is rapidly being reduced to technical transfer and professionalization to support the anti-terrorism campaign (Kristoff, 2012; Mustafa, 2015). Comparative studies of SSR policies carried out in Africa (Baker, 2011), East Timor (Sahin & Feaver, 2013), Afghanistan and in the Arab world (Kartas, 2013; Sedra, 2007) have brought to light a three-way process: a difficulty in including non-state actors, a narrowing of the definition of security to military and state levels and a potential alignment with foreign geopolitical interests. These processes have converged into a focus on the modernizing and professionalizing missions of SSR. But they work on different scales, and in terms of the latter component, post-September 11 political concerns and the US “global war on terror” proved a turning point, particularly—as is to be expected—in countries seen as strategic to anti-terrorism. USAID, the Department of State and the Department of Defense published joint guidelines stating that “SSR can help ... reinforce US diplomatic, development, and defence priorities, and reduce long-term threats to US security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies beyond our borders” (Department of State, Department of Defense, & USAID, 2009, p. 2). This was a US development in the first instance, but not uniquely so. SSR was revised in the light of strategic considerations that saw fragile states as the primary source and sites of terrorism.¹¹ Strengthening the capacities of these states, especially in the security sector, was made a Western policy priority. For instance, the OECD's SSR unit, “Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation” was renamed the “International Network on Conflict and Fragility” (INCAF) in 2009. This reinterpretation has resulted in a return to the traditional conception of security. More generally, renewed priority has been given to state institutions as partners in co-operation. The political genealogy of the SSR thus brings two characteristic dimensions of an apparatus to light. First, there is the composite, even contradictory, quality of the various components in this ensemble—the “disparate” dear to Foucault. In ideas and practices, tensions emerge. This does not, however, prevent—and this is the second dimension—an

¹¹ For a concrete analysis of the link thus made between fragile states and in Africa, see Lebœuf and Antil (2007).

emergence of the strategic securitization matrix within SSR itself. Thus, the introduction of SSR policies contributes in general to the securitization of development. Within SSR itself, this process can be seen in the increasingly clear shift in SSR policies towards security force professionalization, anti-terrorism security co-operation and border control.

4 | SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN LEBANON: ANTI- TERRORIST PROFESSIONALIZATION OR DEMOCRATIC CONTROL?

The history of how SSR has been set up in Lebanon, a country that has been partly categorized as a “fragile state,”¹² is quite a good illustration of this securitization process. It has been directly affected by the close connection between policies implemented under the SSR label and what had originally been Western anti- terrorism policies. It was in the aftermath of Syria's withdrawal in 2005 that the first SSR campaign was launched in 2006 with British military co- operation, “acting by proxy for the US” (Picard, 2009, p. 262). 2004 UN Security Council resolution 1559 for the dissolution of all militias was instrumental in inaugurating this perspective. Western SSR policies in Lebanon thus started out with the disarmament of militias, which primarily meant Hezbollah. In the aftermath of the 2006 war, the Lebanese government put a brake on the project, to avoid having to confront Hezbollah, which had been strengthened through its fight and strategic positioning during the war. Thus, it was an external Western initiative by security actors to implement an SSR- labelled policy. Lebanon is a particular example of the tensions surrounding definitions of security under the SSR label. Thus, subsequently, Lebanon had two coterminous types of SSR- labelled policies. First, policies to strengthen military co-operation and security force professionalization or “efficiency”-boosting. Secondly, policies for the democratic control of these forces, awareness- raising on human rights and on “accountability.” While they can be presented as joint aims, in practice they are based on different issues and can have contradictory impacts.

Thus, in 2007, the Swiss- funded, Geneva-based DCAF, which also has ties to the OECD, reintroduced the notion of SSR in Lebanon, highlighting the objectives of democratic control over the security sector. The programme was addressed to the Middle East as a whole. The foundation wanted Lebanon to be the starting point for expansion, following other attempts in Egypt, Jordan and Palestine.¹³ In 2007, the foundation encouraged Lebanon to join its council, which would allow it to make requests for technical support. Struggling to create national demand and to get civil society involved, the foundation considerably scaled down its original ambitions in order to focus on workshops and mapping out legislation. After 2011, the regional focus shifted to the Palestinian territories. Nevertheless, the evolution of the situation in Lebanon following the crisis in Syria, notably with the armed involvement of Hezbollah in Syria and the influx of refugees, has given the area renewed importance. In 2017, DCAF has been involved in the annual SSR training in the MENA

¹² Questions as to the stability of Lebanon are often raised in political analyses, but it only partly fits into categories. Lebanon was number 43 in the Fragile States Index of the Fund for Peace in 2017 (<http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data/>), and the Fund considered its situation to be worsening and high risk but noted the country's “resiliency” in 2015 (The Fund for Peace, 2015, p. 25). The World Bank also included it in its list of fragile situations (World Bank, 2017), owing to the presence of UN peacekeepers. The OECD did not, however, include it on its 2016 list (OECD, 2016). The Syrian crisis and the strong influx of refugees has reinforced this perception of low stability.

¹³ See Al Hussein, de Martino, Bocco, Friedrich and Luethold (2006), on Palestinian security governance and the link with development.

region carried out by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development, in collaboration with the EU, and which is taking place in Beirut this year. This training is open to participants from different sectors (diplomacy, justice, security, defence, development, etc.) and is focused on the issues of synergy between the various actors. This is entirely in line with the reinforcement of the security/development matrix which SSR emerged from, with the inclusion of a MENA-specific contextualization, in acknowledgement of certain critiques that SSR policies have attracted. Since 2007, the Arab Reform Initiative (an Arab research and policy network with a dedicated SSR programme) has also run workshops with civil and military experts and politicians, as well as publishing working papers. This network consists of Arab research and policy institutes with partners from the US and Europe (DCAF also being one of their partners) and it receives Arab, Western and international funding. The network project has specifically defined SSR as a way to challenge Arab “securitocracies” by promoting the public accountability of security forces, and national debate with a particular focus on security force privatization.¹⁴ In Lebanon, unlike other countries such as Morocco, the network has struggled to promote debate. This has been put down to the fragmentation of Lebanese security forces. These efforts have been renewed at further expense since 2012 with the launch of a “human-centred” SSR project. The British NGO International Alert and the Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies pilot the project, and their work has mainly consisted of a 2013 study on perceptions of security in Lebanon, and a national conference in 2014 to promote dialogue between security actors in Lebanon, NGOs and associations. NGOs have been making regular calls for greater attention to be paid to human rights and human security in SSR. The most recent has been from the Lebanese NGO ALEF – act for human rights in 2017, which is producing a publication and making recommendations on the subject with the support of the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (ALEF – act for human rights, 2017). Such calls, and the adoption of terms such as “human-centred” SSR are indicative of the tensions between the different versions of SSR. They also highlight the increased use of SSR terminology recently by NGOs, often together with foreign donors. The study on perceptions of security in Lebanon was funded by the EU, which made SSR one of the three priorities for its multi-annual programme in Lebanon in 2011 (EU, 2013). Its work focuses on training for Lebanese security agencies, and has grown in scale since 2016 with the launch of the “European SSR Lebanon project,” which focuses on building the capacities of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the General Directorate of General Security (GD GS) (EU, Delegation of the European Union to Lebanon, 2016). It should be connected to the role of Lebanon in the fight against terrorism and the control of immigration and borders, as well as renewed concern over its stability.

Alongside these initiatives, bilateral and multilateral military co-operation agreements were signed with the Lebanese army, and notably the anti-terrorism unit of the Internal Security Forces (Belloncle, 2006) as part of SSR policy. There has been a focus on material support and training for army officers (particularly from the US, the UK and France). These agreements fit the wider context behind the pressures to set up SSR in the Arab world, namely the global war on terror and the political objective of strengthening Arab states’ capacities to co-operate with Western states (Luethold, 2004; Picard, 2009). Since 2011, the Syrian crisis has reinforced fears of destabilization in Lebanon and given fresh impetus to this policy, with renewed support for the Lebanese army and a focus on anti-terrorism and militarization, mainly from the United States but also Saudi Arabia.¹⁵ However, the same concern has also placed limits on military co-operation: “the international community is reluctant because they

¹⁴ From 2007 to 2011, a network project worked specifically on “Arab Securitocracies and Security Sector Reform” (<http://www.arab-reform.net/en/node/818>). Adib (2012) is one publication to emerge from the project.

¹⁵ A new three billion dollar military fund for the purchase of French weapons was announced in 2015.

consider that the army is close to the Hezbollah and they do not want to improve its effectiveness to the advantage of the Hezbollah. So, they impose conditions and they agree about the kind of equipment to be used in repression, as in Nahr al-Bared,¹⁶ but not more” (personal communication, SSR stakeholder, Beirut, December 15, 2010). As Western powers have been unsure of the trends at work within Lebanese State military institutions, they have both championed and withheld co-operation. Strengthening the state has been associated here with accepting an external definition of defence and security policies. In Lebanon, the disjuncture between external and national definitions has heightened the perception of SSR as an external agenda (Belloncle, 2006), particularly with respect to Israel.¹⁸ But it also shows how, even given the extent of Western pressure, there is some room for manoeuvre for the host state. Lebanon resumed using terrorist as a category in its communications in the aftermath of the 2006 war, but with some different inflections to Western definitions. There was a national reassessment of the category of terrorist and it was applied to the Fatah al-Islam group, viewed as a threat to national security, while the legitimacy of Hezbollah was upheld (Mansour, 2009). The way in which SSR policy has been implemented in Lebanon highlights the ambivalence between its various objectives. There have been diverging interpretations of SSR policy. For example, when OECD representatives and the aforementioned Arab network met to discuss SSR, they found that the objectives they had listed under SSR did not fully match. The Arab network had particularly focused on how to challenge authoritarian regimes and question the impact of foreign intervention (personal communication, a director of the network, May 15, 2012).

In terms of its implementation, the twin objectives of efficiency and accountability have not been connected, or even contradicted one another, despite sometimes appearing alongside one another in the programmes. For example, an official link between “effectiveness” and “democratic control and rule of law” is maintained in the EU training programmes (EU, 2013). But a certain kind of professionalization could go against the SSR stance on accountability, as has been demonstrated, for example, by military support for the ISF, which “has empowered the agency enough to challenge civilian authority and has contributed to the erosion of the agency's legitimacy” (Smaira, 2014, p. 332). Second, even within a single objective such as promoting military efficiency, classical bilateral co-operation has been favoured over joint policies, often resulting in overlap and competition, as stated by the EU delegation Security Sector and Stabilisation Attaché and the UK Stabilisation Advisor (Smaira, 2014, p. 295). The absence of political coherence in the field and the fragmentation of the initiatives under the SSR label are not unique to Lebanon and have been discussed in other case studies (Chandler, 2005; Hendrickson & Kasongo, 2011). They can also help the host state to recover some room for manoeuvre, providing a choice between the different programmes offered. In Congo for example, the SSR was at first restricted to DDR programmes with different international actors—here, mainly the World Bank and the UNDP—promoting reintegration programmes for fighters. The competition,

¹⁶ From May to August 2007, the Lebanese armed forces and internal security forces fought the armed group Fatah al-Islam inside the Palestinian refugee camp Nahr al-Bared (close to Tripoli). Fatah al-Islam is a Salafist Jihadist group that has declared war on Western objectives, mainly in Iraq and Lebanon (including on the Lebanese government, which it considers pro-Western). It has adopted anti-Syrian positions. The group emerged from a split within the Fatah Intifada in November 2006. (That group is itself the outcome of a split within Fatah in 1983. The Fatah Intifada first turned to Islamist ideologies during the 1990s.) ¹⁸ According to the survey of the Arab Development Report in Lebanon, “occupation and foreign influence” is one of the main perceived threats to human security, just below economic and personal security. (UNDP, 2009, p. 26). In the 2013 International Alert and LCPS study, Israel once again appears as one of the main threats, along with political instability and the war with Syria (Wannis, 2014, p. 5).

rather than co-ordination, between them gave the Congolese authorities an arbitration position (Joana, 2004, p. 121).

In this sense, the political genealogy of SSR in Lebanon has not turned out to be a continuous, frictionless process, fully defined from the exterior. It is important to undertake a non- unilateral reading. An overall securitization effect can be highlighted. It is apparent in political technologies, which are increasingly connected to anti- terrorism policies. Security actors have come into focus in a semantics of security that is partially appropriated by development actors. The application of the security framework has also resulted in ‘reality effects,’ which we will return to, by participating to the classification and categorization of populations through specific lenses, and thus to the production of “a regime of truth and norms” (Escobar, 1984, p. 387). But SSR has also proved to be a disparate apparatus, infused with tensions, whose implementation and definition are called into question or transformed through national appropriation.

5 | APPROPRIATIONS AND DISJUNCTIONS

As we have seen, the SSR apparatus is far from necessarily being a coherent ensemble. Sometimes it has had unexpected effects on the reception of these policies by national actors, and this on two levels. First, the discourse elements and semantics used, and secondly the political technologies that have been set up. In its reception, this dual level has been perceived in terms of North–South power relations, and the strategic function of the apparatus has been questioned, or even distrusted, in this context, beyond the political declarations on the wellbeing of the populations surrounding it. Thus, beyond the question of how SSR policies are imposed on host states and how they reinterpret or even (somewhat) adjudicate between them, their close association to anti- terrorism impedes take-up on the non- state local level. These policies have been met with suspicion and the sense that their focus on populations’ wellbeing is a mere façade for policies which primarily ensure Western states’ security. The articulation between Western State security and people’s individual security within these countries, as well as the definition of the subject of security, is far from straightforward (Larzillière & Micheletti, 2010; Larzillière & Galy, 2010; Sayigh, 2007). This is the case with police professionalization programmes, but organizations looking to promote democratic control and individual security as a preparatory step for development have also had difficulties and met with limited success. In Lebanon, these essentially foreign- funded initiatives (Chuter, 2015, p. 10) met with little response other than from a limited circle of specialists. As it is, questions of “security” are very sensitive. Even when the notion is characterized as “human,” it retains strong connotations as soon as it is used by Western organizations, as one NGO official explained:

The first time they presented it to us; I thought that is something quite foreign ... that the West now promotes. I was with colleagues of the Middle East in Norway, and we immediately thought that human security is something to promote peace with Israel ... And at that time there was no connection with development (personal communication, NGO leader, Beirut, December 21, 2010).

But it should be stressed that some NGOs are again taking up the theme of “human security,” partly in order to obtain funding (personal communications, NGO members, Beirut, December 2010 and December 2011). And while the theme is clearly more readily accepted at state level, the latter is not

necessarily in favour of increasing the accountability of its forces and parliamentary control over them (Egnell & Haldén, 2009).

Beyond the divergences between Western actors promoting the approach, there are also discontinuities between their interests and local stakes, which these policies do little to take into account, as they are often developed without any real contextualization (Gaulme, 2004; Podder, 2013). The state approach tends to ignore forms of power and social organization which are unofficial but very real. One example is the vision of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in 2000, which initially emerged from the perception of an institutional and political vacuum, but then faced clashes and intense competition between different existing political forces during the implementation process (Sahin & Feaver, 2013, pp. 1063–1064). Moreover, the states concerned have tended to adopt these policies to tackle policing and armed management crises in their countries. This is the case in East Timor, where in 2006 those in power had little interest in the public enquiry carried out by the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor- Leste (UNMIT), but much more in resolving a “management crisis” between the police and the army (Sahin & Feaver, 2013). Similarly, in Lebanon, the army has seen SSR as a means of improving its efficiency and decision-making processes.¹⁷ Quite paradoxically, the pursuit by the various actors involved in this range of diverse, sometimes conflicting, interests had the convergent effect of reinforcing the downgrading of SSR to questions of professionalization. Between the security interests of the organizations that set up these policies, the aims of the host states, and the reluctance of non- state actors and those who are not in the security sector to become involved, issues of accountability or democratic control became sidelined.

Moreover, even when there is agreement on SSR as a tool for technical transfer and professionalization, obstacles to implementation may arise from the sensitive question of the choice of local actors to be supported. Once again, the articulation between the security of Western states and the security of individuals in these countries is unclear. To overcome this, the need for bottom-up approaches based on a “community approach” and “local ownership” has been stressed (Schroeder & Chappuis, 2014), as has the importance of including non- state security actors in countries where the state does not have the monopoly of legitimate violence (Andersen, 2012). One of the possible harmful effects of SSR policies that fail to take this component into consideration is to increase competition between these actors and the state, and to reinforce rather than reduce violence (Rivard Piché, 2014). However, including these non- state actors can bring other kinds of difficulties to light. In Sierra Leone, DFID has been faced with a dilemma: the policy advocates the inclusion of non- state actors while the mode of functioning of the local chiefdoms is non- democratic and barely compatible with the organization's decision- making processes (Denney, 2013). Relations with populations and the issue of non- state security actors are thus two basic stumbling blocks that have been highlighted by internal critics of SSR.

On the ground, therefore, tensions have emerged over the various aims of SSR, the different actors concerned by it, clashes with local issues, and the state or non- state reception of these policies. Beyond considerations of implementational and possibly reorganization- related obstacles, a more structural

¹⁷ Such reform of the decision- making processes and improvement of efficiency had seemed especially necessary following the dysfunctional communication and friendly fire between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared in 2007 (personal communication, former general, SSR stakeholder, Beirut, December 2010).

contradiction manifests itself. This involves a reinforcement of the state on the basis of an external definition of its security policy (which championing non- state actors does not resolve). Professionalization policies further contribute to the ambivalence. As Escobar (1984,

p. 387) has noted on development discourse, “the technification allowed experts to remove from the political realm problems which would otherwise be political and to recast them into the apparently more neutral realm of science.”¹⁸ Indeed, based on a discourse on expertise, efficiency, good governance and standardization, they tend to depoliticize the approach by not stating the ultimate objectives and values, eliminating debate on the objects and values that are at play, with norms being imposed all the while (Tidjani Alou, 2011, p. 114). A security system defined from the exterior is imposed as a norm. The question of how the legitimacy of the state is thus constructed in the eyes of the populations affected is sidestepped, as is that of the link between state and society. This can result in the setting up of institutions which are sometimes described as “empty shells,” as in Kosovo or in Iraq (Jackson, 2001). Depoliticization and technical “neutrality” indeed do not affect the perception of these security norms as “a Western enterprise ... inscribed in a power relationship” (Hours, 2005).

6 | CONCLUSION

This examination of the political genealogy of security in development has highlighted the process of how security has permeated development policies. Just as development actors planned, the use of security semantics has helped to make their objectives a greater priority and has led to new funding. Nonetheless, there has been a change of direction within this process. The production of security norms has contributed to the development policy being crafted in terms of security. In the case of SSR, the obstacles to implementation have been as much about the contradictory objectives within the concept itself as it has about obstacles in the field. Strengthening host states can be advocated for, all while the external implementation of such “strengthening” policy can result in undermining these states’ legitimacy and capacity to define their policies. For domestic perceptions of these policies, the question of whose security is involved is as much at stake as the link to development.

SSR has the disparate, patchy nature of the apparatus scheme, including many features that are in a state of tension, but which nevertheless contribute to an overall securitization effect. The use of security semantics has tended to produce frames of reference and categories focused on the “threatening” aspect of the societies in question, hence formatting the analysis of these societies. It is probably just as interesting to look at what the framing is centred on as what it does not mention. Beyond oppositions or contradictions between security and development policies, another question here concerns the approaches that are taken towards the affected populations, as part of power- knowledge relations. It is part of a global process of normalization, quantification and standardization in Western policies

¹⁸ The implementation of anti- torture European programmes in Turkey is an example of what is at stake with these depoliticization processes. Bahçecik (2015) shows that the proposed approach is technical: torture in police custody does not stem from an open policy of intimidation of the population or state crimes, but from a lack of training of law enforcement personnel, which is expected to decline once the police have access to better investigation techniques. It entails financing new technologies, such as setting up a DNA data bank, and avoids campaigns against torture or investigation into cases of police torture. This depoliticized approach to torture has had the paradoxical consequence of increasing state control over the population. It prevents a normative debate over the use of torture, an outcome which is linked in practice to the political choices made during the project.

which, by referring to supposedly politically neutral expertise,¹⁹ tends to depoliticize these societies. This depoliticization has a dual effect. In terms of the introduction of such policies, it conceals the issues and political choices at stake, in terms of their reception, it helps to prevent normative and axiological debates from taking place. Paradoxically, this depoliticization does not prevent an extremely political reception of these policies. The way in which they are perceived as incorporated into highly specific power relationships determines how they are judged and received. For example, Western development policies in the Arab world have come increasingly to be seen as just another way to implement a Western geopolitical agenda, and have been increasingly rejected and delegitimized (Abu- Sada & Challand, 2011; Larzillière & Micheletti, 2010). This growing rejection could also be analysed in terms of counter- hegemony, in which the political labelling used in development policies is transformed, adapted or rejected.

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¹⁹ For a detailed case study of how “hegemonic consensus” can be created within the Mediterranean development network of the World Bank, see Hanafi and Tabar (2005).

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