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Election Results and Public Contestation of the Vote: An Overview of the Uganda 2011 General Elections

Valérie Golaz and Claire Médard

Uganda's 2011 general elections mark the success of a regime in its bid to retain power. It was characterised by the reelection of President Yoweri Museveni and by a large majority of votes expressed in favour of the National Resistance Movement (NRM), both at parliamentary and Local Council levels. If cases of actual violence during the campaign and the elections remained localised, the strong presence of armed forces was noted, especially in Kampala (the army coming in to assist the police force during elections).¹¹¹ Yet, at different stages during the electoral process, complaints were voiced about the fairness of the elections, from the nomination of the Electoral Commission (EC) in charge of organising the vote, to the actual vote counts. The EC itself was the first target of criticism. The decision to renew the mandate of its chairman, Badru Kiggundu, who had held the position during the controversial 2006 elections, was viewed as contentious.¹¹² The second major wave of criticism

111 Dicta Asimwe, "Kayihura's Plan for 'Devil's Night'," *The Independent*, 4 February 2011, 10-12.

112 "Mistrust was also based on the fact that the EC, almost unchanged since the 2006 elections, had been severely criticised by the Supreme Court for its handling of those

focused on the voters' register. Problems encountered during registration and during actual voting constituted the core of the complaints, some leading to petitions. Results were contested on different grounds. A few reports tried to tackle this issue systematically at the national level.¹¹³

In this chapter, we shall not deal with the issue of fraud as such, leaving this to the Judiciary. But we will explore different aspects of the vote in an effort to assess possible distortions and to shift perspectives on the vote. In addition to rigging there are many ways in which a vote can be distorted. To an extent, electoral representation is in itself a distorted form of civic participation, as though adopting a number of internationally recognised guidelines is considered enough to validate a vote. The aim of this chapter is to assess the electoral process and the election results both locally and nationally, as precisely as possible, with spatial information going down to the district and constituency levels.¹¹⁴ We chose to map out results and to represent the data that was collected spatially. We encountered some difficulties in gathering systematic and localised information, for instance tackling recent boundary changes and available data sources, and we hope we have managed to address

elections," European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM), *Uganda, Final Report, General Elections 18 February 2011* (Kampala: EUEOM, 2011), 6. For a further discussion see Chapter 9 in this book.

113 In particular, the Democracy Monitoring Group published a report three days after the presidential and parliamentary elections and the EUEOM published its full report on the elections three weeks later.

114 Our research relies on official sources (EC documents, UBOS population data, Uganda Legal Information Institute archives, etc.) as well as on media analyses. These public documents have rendered possible an analysis at the constituency level, and if not, at the district level for the sake of comparison. Base maps for this paper (Maps 1 and 2) were drawn with the valuable help of Mr. Peter Nsimiire, Makerere University Institute of Environment and Natural Resources (MUIENR). We thank the UBOS GIS section for its help. Since administrative boundaries in Uganda have changed much in the past decade, we had to update the district and constituency maps ourselves, sometimes from text information on these boundaries. These base maps are research documents and should not be considered as official – any imprecision is ours. We also used Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP) unpublished maps, for our analysis: Parliamentary Elections 2006 (Constituency MP)-First Place Party in Each Constituency; Parliamentary Elections 2006 (District Woman MP)-First Place Party in Each District; LC5 Elections 2006-First Place Party in Each District.

these shortcomings satisfactorily. Yet other shortcomings are linked to the data itself. Although the EC provided a number of downloadable documents on its website, some important information is unavailable to the public (e.g. actual numbers of voters per constituency). Besides, all data are protected, which means that data cannot be easily reworked, thus blocking attempts at reconstitution of the information at different levels.¹¹⁵ As for the media, in spite of a few attempts at presenting national results in the press,¹¹⁶ in no instance was an article published after the elections exhaustive in terms of the spatial representation of the vote. Despite these shortcomings we decided to base our analysis on material made available to the public. In some cases official sources (EC documents, Uganda Bureau of Statistics [UBOS], population data, Uganda Legal Information Institute archives, etc.) did not

115 A few documents available on the EC website (www.ec.or.ug/eresults/) provided the results of previous general elections (2001, 2006). Concerning the 2011 elections, documents available for the presidential elections were the following: the proportion of votes cast in favour of each candidate plus the number of registered voters per polling station (note that totals are not computed and that the order in which results are presented is not hierarchical – not by sub-counties, and then parish) and the results per district. Electoral Commission. 2011a, “Presidential Elections, February 2011. District Tally Sheet.” http://www.ec.or.ug/Elec_results/2011_Pres_dis.pdf; Electoral Commission. 2011b, “Presidential Election Results 2011.” http://www.ec.or.ug/Elec_results/2011_Pres_Pstn.pdf; For the parliamentary and the LC5 elections, the EC published the names, party and votes cast in favour of each candidate online, excluding data for unopposed candidates for which no figures are provided, and the list of the winners. Electoral Commission. 2011c, “Results for Directly Elected Members of Parliament, General Elections 2011.” http://www.ec.or.ug/Elec_results/2011_Direct_MPs.pdf; Electoral Commission. 2011d, “Results for district woman member of parliament, General Elections 2011.” http://www.ec.or.ug/Elec_results/2011_Woman_MP.pdf; Electoral Commission. 2011e, “Results for District Chairperson. General Elections 2011.” http://www.ec.or.ug/Elec_results/2011_District_Chairperson_winners.pdf. Though the voters’ register was available online, only its July 2010 version was displayed, not taking into account the changes made during the verification exercise after this date. Generally speaking it can be noted that many documents found online on the website of the Electoral Commission were outdated. For instance, the registration statistics provided are dated 2009.

116 Taddeo Bwambale, “President Museveni Wins in All Regions,” *New Vision*, 22 February 2011, 3; Ismail Musa Ladu, “Ghost Voters Found on Register,” *Daily Monitor*, 22 February 2011.

allow us to map out results at the constituency level, but only at the district level.

Our spatial analysis provides an overview of the 2011 election results, and sheds light on voting patterns and political shifts between 2006 and 2011, which highlight the overall gains of the NRM but also some regional disparities (1). We then turn to territorial distortions of the vote based on the way constituencies and districts were remodelled over time (2). Still looking at possible distortions, the issue of the representation of the adult population in Uganda is tackled (3). Finally, we review public satisfaction with the vote (4).

A Regional Analysis of NRM Strongholds

The 2011 general elections were characterised by overall gains for the NRM and Museveni, who received more votes than he did in 2006. Our aim is to relate these gains to a variety of local and regional situations in order to give a general and detailed picture of election results. We will start by mentioning the “rules of the game”, then we shall describe the presidential election results, followed by the parliamentary and Local Council contests and finally we shall relate these results to participation.

Modalities of Representation, Parties and Candidates

The presidential and parliamentary elections held on 18 February 2011 were followed by Local Council and mayoral elections a few days later. In Uganda a presidential candidate is elected if he/she gets more than 50% of the votes nationally. If not, a second vote is held between the two best-performing candidates. Parliamentary seats are occupied by different types of elected representatives: one member of parliament (MP) per constituency through direct poll (238 MPs), one female representative per district, also through direct poll (112 Woman MPs), 25 representatives of “special interest” groups, elected within their respective groups, the youth (five), the workers (five), people with disabilities (five) and the army (10). As for Local Council elections, the LC5 (at district level) and LC3 (at county level) chairpersons are also elected through direct poll. These elective positions have nominated counterparts that act as representatives of the central government in territorial

administration and are found all over the country, such as at the district level, the Resident District Commissioners (RDCs).

Apart from the NRM, a number of opposition parties were registered for the 2011 electoral race. The major parties were the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), whose presidential candidate, Kizza Besigye, had already opposed Museveni in 2006; the Democratic Party (DP), led by Norbert Mao and the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), whose candidate for presidency in 2011 was Olara Otunnu. Smaller, more localised parties also participated: the Conservative Party (CP), the Justice Forum (JEEMA), the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the People's Progressive Party (PPP) led by Bidandi Ssali, a former NRM cabinet minister, and the People's Development Party (PDP) led by Abed Bwanika. There was a single independent candidate running for the presidential election, Walter Samuel Lubega. During the campaign, Kizza Besigye was appointed chairman of the Inter-Party Cooperation (IPC), a group of opposition parties who intended to unite against Museveni. CP, JEEMA and SDP joined FDC in this venture, but both DP and UPC refused to, leaving the opposition divided.

Presidential Elections

President Museveni was reelected with 68.4% of votes cast in his favour. This was a greater margin than in 2006, when he won by 59.3%, and a percentage almost as high as the one obtained in 2001 (69.4%). In fact, in 2011 he received more votes than any other candidate in 105 districts out of 112 (Map 3). Opposition candidates only managed to receive more votes than Museveni in seven districts, six of them located in northern and eastern Uganda and one in Kampala. In Kampala, where there were more than one million registered voters, as well as in three districts in Teso (Kaberamaido, Serere and Soroti), the FDC presidential candidate, Kizza Besigye, was the most popular candidate; in three districts in Acholi (Amuru, Gulu and Nwoya), Norbert Mao, the DP presidential candidate, was the preferred candidate. These stand out as the strongholds of opposition presidential candidates, i.e. Gulu for Mao, Soroti and Kampala for Besigye. It is worth noting that the DP did not appear at all on the map of the 2006 presidential election results

by district wins, with very few votes received in Acholi.¹¹⁷ The 2006 map reflects a dual antagonism between districts where Museveni won, mostly south of Lake Kyoga, and those where Besigye won, north of Lake Kyoga except for the Karamoja region, in northeastern Uganda. In 2011, Museveni received less than 50% of the votes cast in only 13 out of 112 districts. In 35 districts, he managed to get more than 80% of the votes (Map 4). Museveni received overwhelming support from a large area in western Uganda, from Bunyoro on Lake Albert in the north to Isingiro in the south, at the border with Tanzania, with a few exceptions (Kasese, Rukungiri); his support was as strong, yet more isolated, in parts of the east and northeast (Karamoja, Mt Elgon, Northern Busoga).

Compared to 2006, Besigye's loss in 2011 was striking. The number of districts where Besigye was the preferred candidate reduced dramatically in favour of Museveni and, to a lesser extent, Mao. Besigye lost more than 50 percentage points in some parts of northern Uganda, while Museveni gained an average of 42 points per district in the whole of the northern/West Nile region. Apart from the northern region, the eastern part of the country also showed deep changes in voting patterns, to Museveni's favour. Shifts in the voting patterns were also visible in the rest of the country, once more to be mostly in favour of Museveni (this is especially true in Kasese and Bundibugyo in western Uganda). In a few cases the changes were in favour of Besigye (Gomba in Buganda, the former Kyenjojo district in western Uganda, in Mbarara, Mitooma and Rukungiri in southern Uganda), which points at a recent fragmentation of Museveni's bastion in southwestern Uganda.

Parliamentary and Local Elections

NRM candidates stood in 236 out of 238 constituencies. The opposition managed to field candidates to represent them in most constituencies.¹¹⁸ In a few cases NRM candidates were unopposed (1/238 candidates in the

117 In 2006 the DP presidential candidate, John Ssebaana Kizito, received less than 2% of the vote in Gulu District, while Besigye received 85% and Museveni 13%.

118 "The IPC fielded candidates in more than 80% of parliamentary constituencies in 2011 and supported a candidate of another party or an independent in many of the remaining constituencies." EUEOM, *Uganda, Final Report*, 10.

constituency MP elections – only David Bahati – was unopposed, 3/112 in the Woman MP elections¹¹⁹ and 6/112 in the LC5 elections). As for independent candidates, most were former NRM members who had resigned after the contested party primaries in August 2010, when they were not selected as party candidates and decided to stand on their own without party affiliation, an occurrence that suggested rifts and tensions within the ruling party. Not all independents had formerly belonged to the NRM. Moses Kasibante, a candidate in Rubaga North, a disputed constituency in Kampala, for instance, was a former DP supporter (see Chapter 7). In the majority of cases independent candidates are liable to side with the NRM rather than with the opposition (for that reason, independent candidates are represented by orange, a colour close to the NRM's yellow, in the attached maps).

The parliamentary election results show the large majority of seats were acquired by NRM all over the country, at both constituency MP and district Woman MP levels (Maps 7 and 10). The NRM received 69.3% of the constituency seats in Parliament and 76.8% of the Woman MP seats. Opposition parties also have regional bases, though in some cases these were scattered. Although the Mao presidential vote was overwhelming in the area of Gulu in the north, DP MPs were all found in central Uganda close to the shores of Lake Victoria (in Buganda). The UPC stronghold was located around Lira in northern Uganda. Though its presidential candidate, Olara Otunnu, did not win a majority vote in any district, the party gained several MPs in Apac, Oyam and Pader (northern Uganda). Amongst opposition parties, only FDC showed a wider national base, although relatively weak. One of its remaining strongholds, in eastern Uganda, is the region of Soroti, where both parliamentary and presidential votes for FDC overlap.

Looking at parliamentary elections as a whole, opposition MPs did not fare as badly as opposition presidential candidates. One of the particularities of the vote was that some areas chose opposition MPs yet the presidential vote remained in favour of Museveni. In both the constituency MP and the district woman representative elections, NRM seems to have lost ground in the southern half of the country and gained support in the northern half (Maps 8 and 11). In the north, the situation is less clear-cut: some districts

119 EC website, <http://www.ec.or.ug>

and constituencies shifted from opposition to the NRM but a few were lost by the NRM (Maps 9 and 12). Opposition MPs gained new support, mainly in the south of the country (except in Bukoto South, in Masaka District, where the elected MP is now NRM). Interestingly, the districts where Museveni has lost ground since 2006 (Map 5), quite a few, do not overlap with districts where opposition MPs were elected (Map 9). This emphasises the dissociation between presidential and parliamentary elections.

Compared to parliamentary elections, Local Council election results (Map 13) confirm some specific places as opposition strongholds (Bukomansimbi, near Masaka in central Uganda, Sironko near Mbale in eastern Uganda). Once more, at this electoral level NRM candidates were elected in a large proportion (76.8% of the seats were taken by NRM candidates), a proportion similar to that found in the Woman MP elections.

By combining the 2011 results for presidential, parliamentary and Local Council elections we present an overview of NRM support throughout the country. The shift towards the NRM did not concern the whole country as a block, and was stronger in some areas than in others. There are places where the NRM won at all levels, and where Museveni's support appeared extremely strong. In other places Museveni and NRM support was weak. Of course, many constituencies fell between those two extremes, with political leaders of different parties being elected. Generally, NRM support (Map 14) followed the lines of Museveni's support (Map 4), with a few exceptions. If the gains of the regime in the western Uganda block remained impressive, NRM's bases in other parts of Uganda were not as broad, with the most isolated support found in constituencies located in Kisoro District at the southwestern corner of Uganda, in Abim in the northeast, in Kapchorwa and Bukwo along the Kenyan border, and in Buyende and Kamuli districts in northern Busoga (eastern Uganda).

Considering the NRM strongholds also identified areas where NRM support was rather weak, though these areas were much less extensive and rather localised (Map 15). Opposition was strongly rooted in Aswa, in Lango region, in northern Uganda (immediately to the north of Gulu Municipality). In addition to Acholi, Lango and Teso regions, opposition was relatively well

represented in Kasese, western Uganda, around Masaka (Bukomansimbi district), Kampala-Wakiso in central Uganda, and in Sironko at the foot of Mt Elgon (Budadiri West).

Participation Rates

The statistical correlation between participation rates and support for Museveni was commented upon by Green.¹²⁰ Participation rates were considered rather low (59%) during the presidential and parliamentary elections, and even more so in urban areas (especially, at the district level, in Kampala and Jinja, where the lowest participation rates in Uganda were recorded), in Kalangala and in the north, around Gulu, where less than half of the registered population reached the polling stations (Map 16). In sharp contrast, participation was high in western Uganda, in areas considered to be Museveni's home base. Low participation is a bias that affects the representativeness of the vote and might point to irregularities in voting. Very high participation might also be an indication of anomalies.

Comparing election results and participation as a whole and not looking at presidential election results in isolation makes a number of observations possible. There was high participation in NRM strongholds (Maps 14 and 16). Very high participation rates were found in areas neighbouring the President's home district, in Kiruhura and Buhweju Districts in western Uganda. These high district averages mean that the participation rates in a large proportion of polling stations had to be very high. For instance, a number of polling station results in Kiruhura were cancelled at the last moment because the votes cast outnumbered the number of registered voters.¹²¹ Discrepancies in participation between polling stations were found in other districts, and such massive and strong participation was not found elsewhere. Interestingly, in the northeastern region, both scenarios of low and high participation, found in neighbouring districts, brought NRM MPs.

120 Elliott Green, "Uganda Post-Election Report," *The Monkey Cage Blog*, http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2011/02/23/uganda_post-election_report/ (accessed 30 March 2012).

121 Alfred Tumushabe, "Results From Four Kiruhura Polling Centres Cancelled," *Daily Monitor*, 21 February 2011. This phenomenon was also noted by the EUEOM. EUEOM, *Uganda, Final Report*, 39.

For opposition strongholds the relation between participation and results of the vote did not appear clearly and only a few observations can be made concerning presidential elections. A similar trend appeared in areas where voters rejected the incumbent president. Mao was the chosen candidate in an area where participation was low, just as Besigye was in Kampala, where participation was lowest. It was only in Besigye's stronghold of Soroti that participation was average. This might indicate unease/fear amongst opposition voters about voting for an opposition presidential candidate, their distrust in the electoral process or just the feeling that their vote wouldn't change the final result. This seems to indicate the presidential vote was experienced as being more critical. Strong control over the electoral process, exerted by the NRM regime, was noted.¹²²

By crossing results obtained at different levels of electoral representation, we were able to give a picture of party strongholds. Mapping out participation also helped us to shift our perspective about actual local support given to parties and candidates slightly. The strong vote in favour of Museveni showed his strength in western Uganda, and a more localised support in the other regions. His progression in the north was the major change that occurred in comparison to 2006, though the voter turnout in 2011 was much lower in that region than it was in his western base.

Territorial Distortions of the Vote

Uneven representation due to the difference in sizes of the population grouped in each electoral area is a very common occurrence, its most striking feature generally being the underrepresentation of towns and urban areas. In Uganda, this type of inequality was underlined in the EUEOM report¹²³ and did not necessarily occur to the benefit or detriment of a given party. Gerrymandering, an attempt to establish a political advantage for one party by changing constituency boundaries, is one of the most widespread forms of manipulation of the vote in all countries. In the specific case of Uganda

122 "Resident District Commissioners (RDCs) and agents of various security services were omnipresent, occasionally taking a pro-active role in the electoral process." EUEOM, *Uganda, Final Report*, 7.

123 *Ibid.*, 9.

a combined strategy of creating new districts and new constituencies has taken root over time.¹²⁴ Both have had an impact on the number of elected representatives. First and foremost, the splitting of a constituency into two adds one MP to Parliament for a given area, which means improved representation in Parliament for that specific area. The splitting of a district also adds one MP to Parliament: the female district representative. In the past decade increased interventions and subdivisions of existing administrative and electoral units took place around election time: 2000, 2005-2007 and 2010. The creation of districts has other impacts in terms of local government with a number of official positions, some elected and some nominated, being introduced locally.¹²⁵ According to Green, MPs operating from the capital city, represent a greater threat to the regime than elected representatives based in their regions.¹²⁶

In this section, we shall first discuss the creation of new districts and constituencies in relation to population size and gerrymandering and then we shall turn to the framework of decentralisation and its possible impact on voting patterns.

Creation of New Districts and Constituencies, Population Size and Gerrymandering

In 2006, there were 80 districts and 214 constituencies in Uganda. During the 2006-2011 period, 32 districts – a 40% increase – and 24 constituencies – an 11% increase – were created (Maps 17 and 19). During the 2011 campaign itself, in addition to the districts formed between 2006 and 2011, President Museveni promised 21 more districts; their legal enactment over the next four years is still under discussion in parliament. The first issue which came up was whether the constituencies and districts selected for subdivision were actually the most populated ones and whether the creation of new districts reduced the gaps in terms of population representation (and service delivery).

124 Elliott Green, "Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 45 (2010): 83–103.

125 The non-elected positions can also be used by the NRM to place defeated NRM cadres. Mercy Nalugo, "Government Proposes 21 More new Districts," *Daily Monitor*, 25 August 2011.

126 Green, "Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda."

Registered Voters by Districts

The following analysis is based on the number of voters in 2006 as an indicator of the adult population size, which is difficult to estimate precisely. The average number of registered voters per district was 129,000 voters in 2006, varying from 21,000 in Abim to 764,000 in Kampala (a ratio of 1/36). Some of the new districts were created from the subdivisions of districts found among the most populated ones (Mukono, 346,000 in 2006; Masaka, 318,000; Bushenyi, 308,000) and were split into two and more entities (Map 19). However, Mukono was split into three districts and Bushenyi into five. In contrast, a district neighbouring Bushenyi, Kasese, one of the opposition strongholds in 2006, was not subdivided although 211,000 voters were registered there. The same paradox applies to Tororo in eastern Uganda. In spite of 164,000 registered voters in 2006 it was not split, whereas Pallisa, with only 109,000 voters, was divided. Moreover, some of the districts that were split were among the least populated ones: Nakapiripirit, with 46,000 registered voters; Kapchorwa, with 62,000 and Moroto with 63,000. In 2011, the 112 districts had an average of 125,000 registered voters, lower than in 2006, but this time stretching from 21,000 in Amudat (formerly part of Nakapiripirit in the northeast) to 1,181,000 in Kampala, a ratio of 1/56. In the 2011-2012 creation plans, following campaign promises, it is worth noting that Kampala remains untouched once more, but that Nakapiripirit might be split again, resulting in an even deeper gap in district population representation throughout the country.

Creating New Constituencies and Municipalities

Fewer constituencies than districts were created. According to the law, each "county has at least one constituency".¹²⁷ Among these, two types can be differentiated: those with urban status (municipalities) and others (both rural and urban). Many municipalities were created during the past six years to keep up with urban growth in Uganda. In some cases, their creation was long overdue and resulted from local mobilisation.¹²⁸ The status of municipality

127 Article 63 (2) of the Constitution. EUEOM, *Uganda, Final Report*, 14.

128 For instance, Mukono Municipality, despite a decision that was taken at the end of 2005, was only created on 1 July 2010. Joel Ogwang, "Government Approves Mukono Municipality Plan," *New Vision*, 1 January 2006; John Semakula and Henry Nsubuga,

creates a seat for an MP, leads to the allocation of specific funds for the development of an urban area and also to the election of a mayor. A wide range of municipality sizes exist. Moroto municipality is probably the smallest constituency with only 6,000 registered voters in 2006 and 7,048 in 2011, far below the constituency averages of 49,000 voters in 2006 or 59,000 in 2011. The way municipalities were defined also varied: sometimes it was limited to the boundaries of a town council (Busia, Iganga, Ntungamo), in some cases it included neighbouring parishes (Masindi, Hoima, Kasese, Mukono and Rukungiri), and in other cases they were even carved out of two separate constituencies (Bushenyi). As for districts, new constituencies might be carved out in sparsely populated areas, like Toroma in Usuk (Katakwi District) or from the splitting of Dodoth into two (Kaabong District). In both these cases, one might argue that the creation of constituencies follows the making of new counties, related to the actual size of the area to be administered. Yet a number of constituencies comprising more than 70,000 voters in 2006 were not split (Aringa in West Nile, Burahya in the west, Kibale in the south, Kooki in Central, Busiro South and other constituencies from the Kampala metropolitan area) whereas less populated constituencies were split (Nakaseke and Nakasongola in Central region, for instance, which were also two rather large constituencies in terms of areas covered). The rationale behind constituency creation therefore does not reflect an effort to improve even population representation, but follows a different, unknown, logic, most likely spatial, perhaps political.

A Case of Gerrymandering?

Parliament now comprises 386 seats that are directly elected through universal adult suffrage and out of these, 112 use districts as electoral units. There is even less equality in voting by district than by constituency, for instance a single Woman MP represents the 1,180,000 registered voters for Kampala compared to one for 21,000 in Amudat. New districts have created 32 additional seats for Woman MPs, yet whether this has contributed to NRM gains or not cannot easily be ascertained, as no clear pattern appears (Maps

“NRM Set to Snatch Mukono Back From DP’s Nambooze,” *New Vision*, 20 August 2010.

19 and 11). There seems to be no straightforward and immediate electoral gains rationale in this case.

In the case of mainstream constituencies, 23 constituencies were created between 2006 and 2011, bringing to 238 the number of representatives who were elected in this category in 2011. The creation of 23 constituencies has added the same number of seats to Parliament and has potentially affected the vote in these 23 new constituencies plus the 23 mother constituencies from which they were carved. Map 18 shows constituency subdivisions and vote changes between 2006 and 2011. Most of the newly split constituencies were taken by the NRM in 2011: 35/46 – that is 76% – to be compared, in the case of the non-recently-split constituencies, to 130/192 seats – that is only 68%. This could be seen as a consequence of the splitting of constituencies that were voting NRM in 2006, which is the case for 15 out of the 23 split constituencies. In 12/15 cases it resulted in two NRM MPs being elected instead of one, in Dodoth (Kaabong district), Bunyole, Budioppe, Nakaseke, Buwekula, Bugangaizi, Buyaga and in a number of new municipalities: Iganga, Masindi, Hoima, Ntungamo and Bushenyi. In other cases, new NRM MPs replaced opposition or independent MPs, multiplying by two the NRM gain locally (Nakasongola, Pallisa and Kasese).

Even more strikingly, when comparing Map 8 and Map 18, looking specifically at the shift between 2006 and 2011, the margin of 15 additional seats out of the total gain of 16 seats for the NRM in the whole country was acquired in the recently split constituencies. In these subdivided constituencies, in reality 20 additional seats were gained and five lost. In sharp contrast, in the non-recently-split constituencies the NRM actually gained only one constituency. In comparison, in the recent elections, the opposition lost in total very few seats, one of the recently split constituencies and only two in the non-subdivided constituencies. The status of independent candidates in these elections complicates the picture somewhat, because independents took votes from both NRM and opposition candidates (in Table 3.1 below opposition excludes independents).

Table 3.1: Gains and Losses for the NRM and Opposition According to Old (Non-Recently Split) and Newly Subdivided Constituencies

	Non-recently-split constituencies	Recently split constituencies	Total
New seats gained by NRM	28	20	48
Seats lost by NRM	27	5	32
Balance for NRM	1	15	16
New seats gained by the opposition	17	3	20
Seats lost by the opposition	19	4	23
Balance for the opposition	-2	-1	-3
Total number of constituencies	192	46	238

Note: In this table, independents are not taken into account.

So all in all, the creation of new constituencies was very beneficial to the NRM in the 2011 elections, providing 15 extra seats in Parliament out of the 16 won in the entire country. As for the opposition, who lost one seat in the recently split constituencies and two more nationally, it did not benefit from the process of subdivision of constituencies at all.

Decentralisation Policy and its Impact on the Vote

The Framework of Decentralisation

The creation of new districts is widely referred to as a decentralisation process. Yet it might be argued that we are dealing with a case of deconcentration rather than decentralisation. Adding new districts does not change the hierarchical structure of the existing territorial administration. This policy has been described as a strategy of the ruling party that is linked to patronage, and its aim is to gain support locally.¹²⁹ Officially, the creation of new districts aimed at bringing the administration closer to the people, a first step in promoting development and enhancing local participation. According to the government, decentralisation contributes to improved services, the creation of more employment and business opportunities. However this possibility relies mainly on increased investment on the part of the central government, which

¹²⁹ Green, "Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda."

does not always follow the creation of a new district.¹³⁰ In the actual sense, the whole process might take time, as the means to fulfil electoral promises made when announcing the creation of a new district are not always available. Employment opportunities in new district administration and services are often said to benefit non-locals. So, frustration might arise from such policies and it is worth looking more closely at the time frame when considering the interrelation between NRM gains and actual decentralisation experiences. The promise of a new district by the president when he is campaigning might be the result of perceiving the possibility of obtaining more votes.

New Districts, New Constituencies and Voting Patterns

Are some shifts in voting actually related to the creation of new districts? We consider both the impact the creation of new electoral constituencies (including districts) has on the voting pattern and the reverse: whether the voting pattern has any impact on the decision to split a district or a constituency. A detailed analysis of the voting pattern according to the date of creation of the districts shows that the proportion of votes for the NRM is higher in the more-recently-created districts.¹³¹ Even in "older" districts, the fact that the district was split is statistically correlated to the proportion of votes expressed for the NRM.¹³² A comparison of the maps relating to the 2006-2011 gains and losses of the NRM at the parliamentary and presidential election levels (Maps 5 and 20; Maps 8 and 18; Maps 11 and 21) shows that the creation of new districts has not affected the voting pattern as much as anticipated. For instance, for the presidential elections, the higher proportion of votes expressed for Museveni in the newly created districts simply relates to the fact that some of these districts are located in the northern region where, globally, Museveni gained about 40 points between 2006 and 2011. Increased support for Museveni in, for instance, Lango, cannot be attributed only to district boundary changes, or more generally to the deconcentration policy developed by the NRM government, since it took place both in districts

¹³⁰ Douglas K. Singiza and Jaap de Visser, "Chewing More Than One Can Swallow: the Creation of New Districts in Uganda," *Law, Democracy and Development* 15 (2011).

¹³¹ Green, "Uganda Post-Election Report."

¹³² Green, however, considers "older" districts as both non-recently-split districts and mother districts from which new districts were split.

concerned by subdivisions and in those which were not concerned. Splitting concerned pro-opposition as well as pro-NRM constituencies and districts cannot generally be related to changes in the support the regime received.

Thus, we can conclude that even if the proportion of votes expressed for Museveni in districts recently created is slightly higher than in the others, these districts remain a heterogeneous group and the difference observed obscures the primary impact of other (possibly regional) factors. However, locally, in some areas, district splitting might have resulted in raising confidence in the government. This is not always the case: in some recently split districts, the vote shifted in favour of the opposition, at the district or at the constituency level (for instance in Bukomansimbi, in the former Masaka district). Mukono district was split, then new constituencies were also formed. The creation of Mukono Municipality carved out a pro-opposition constituency (the Municipality) and a pro-NRM one (Mukono North). In the end, instead of one DP seat,¹³³ there was one DP and one NRM seat. In other cases, after subdivision the newly created constituencies were won over by the NRM (Kasese area for instance). However, the creation of municipalities has sometimes aided the introduction of an opposition seat in the urban part of an old constituency – for example in Rukungiri, where both presidential candidates have strong ties, the newly created municipality MP is FDC. This is also the case for Busia Municipality, which was included in a NRM constituency in 2006 and which is now represented by a FDC MP.

In this section we have documented the extent of gerrymandering, with direct gains for the NRM through subdivision of constituencies in areas which were already in favour of the NRM, duplicating its support. It should be noted that additional information, such as the number of voters per constituency, would help to ascertain this process. In some cases, subdividing above-average-population-size districts and constituencies appeared legitimate; yet this was not done consistently and there was no clear improvement in the fight against inequalities stemming from the different sizes of electoral units and population represented by one MP. No attention was paid, it seems, to

133 In 2006 the Mukono North seat was attributed to Peter Bakaluba (NRM), but after ruling, by-elections were held in 2010 and this led to the victory of Betty Nambooze (DP).

inequalities in representation due to the use of districts as electoral units for Woman MPs. In the long run, the making of new districts and associated promises of development did not lead to the expected popularity increase. We could say conclusively that, during the last five years, President Museveni's deconcentration policy has not been responsible for the overall gains he obtained in the presidential elections. These gains should be interpreted in the specific context of the changes that took place in the north and, at the constituency level, in the light of the recent gerrymandering, which resulted in net gains for NRM.

Comparing Registered Voters and Population Estimates

Other possible distortions originate from registration of voters. In addition to participation, other aspects of representation that could cause distortion are disenfranchisement and inadequate voter registration, an issue which we now address by comparing population estimates with the number of registered voters. During the six months prior to the day of the elections, the accuracy of the voters' register was repeatedly questioned.

The total number of registered voters was slightly higher than UBOS estimates of the total adult population of Uganda for mid-2010, when the voters' register was closed (13,950,000 voters).¹³⁴ This high figure has raised many questions. Among those concerned, a pro-democracy civil society organisation, Democracy Monitoring Group (DEMGGroup), conducted an assessment of the voters' register at the beginning of 2011, through the systematic checking of a sample of the register and through a survey. DEMGGroup found a non-negligible number of "ghost voters."¹³⁵ According to press sources, a total of approximately 550,000 voters were foreigners or deceased people, and approximately 1.9 million voters were not registered in the right location.¹³⁶ Discrepancies between numbers of registered voters and

134 Voter registration took place from 3 May to 18 June 2010. EUEOM, *Uganda. Final Report*, 24.

135 Ghost voting refers to a vote being cast while the voter is absent. This includes practices of electoral fraud in which dead people remain on the voter rolls.

136 DEMGGroup, "Uganda Voter Register Audit Report 2011: Findings of the Audit of 2011 Election Voter Register," (DEMGGroup, PowerPoint Presentation, 2011), <http://>

adult population estimates were pointed out in specific regions throughout the country and concerned even more specific age groups, such as the youngest voters (18-23), who were registering for the first time and failed to do so in large numbers, and the oldest (55+), whose number seemed overestimated.

In this section we turn to local variations and distortions in adult population representation in the voters' register, through a systematic comparison of discrepancies between adult population estimates and the number of registered voters. Population estimates for the closing date of the register were published by UBOS, but were based on strong (but not unusual) assumptions. Precise population figures will only be accessed through the coming population census, which, at the time of writing (November 2012) has been postponed. In the meantime, it is difficult to gain a precise number of the population of each constituency. Our approach involves comparing two different scenarios of adult population estimates with the number of registered voters at the district level.¹³⁷ Is the number of registered voters plausible? What does this comparison teach us about the register and about the population at large? In order to find answers to these questions, population estimates at the time of the vote were used and projections will be discussed (1) before we analyse the discrepancies between numbers of registered voters and population estimates in various places throughout the country (2).

Population Estimates at the Time the Register Closed (Mid-2010)

Comparing population estimates and voter figures is not an easy exercise; it is important to understand its complexity. Which might be the most accurate population estimates? The last population census in Uganda was conducted in 2002,¹³⁸ and therefore population estimates in 2010, at the time of the closing of the voters' register, were obtained through a eight-year projection. The population figures published by the UBOS are based on population growth

www.scribd.com/doc/48955500/Uganda-Computer-Audit-Presentation-Feb-16-RS-Edit-1 (accessed 10 February 2011). Ladu, "Ghost Voters Found."

137 Unfortunately, it is not possible to access the number of registered voters per constituency, because the data was not available on the EC website.

138 UBOS, *Population Composition, 2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census Analytical Report* (Kampala: UBOS, 2006).

rates estimated at the district level.¹³⁹ These growth rates were calculated on the basis of the period 1991-2002, because 1991 and 2002 correspond to dates when the last two population censuses were conducted prior to 2010, and therefore are the only two years for which we have precise figures for the population in each administrative unit in Uganda. There are two options for estimating the total projected population: the first one is to use the official projections provided by UBOS in its 2006 report, based on district-level growth rates – this was the option used by DEMGroup (Map 21), the second one is to use a uniform growth rate throughout the country – the official national rate of growth of 3.2% per year (Map 22).

The growth rates by district used for the 2003-2010 projections have a sound basis, and possibly constitute the best estimates. However, it is likely that growth rates changed in some parts of the country between the two periods of 1991-2002 and 2003-2010. If the natural growth is generally captured, the impact of migration is less so. In the past two decades some parts of Uganda have seen important shifts in population due to migration. The most obvious case is that of northern Uganda, where, during 1991-2002, a large proportion of the population was displaced due to the Lord's Resistance Army war, leading to contrasting population growth in specific parts of the region. During the following decade, people were able to return to the areas they had previously fled. Other examples are the areas of settlement of mostly Sudanese and Congolese refugees – Adjumani and Moyo districts in northern Uganda, and on the shores of Lake Albert in western Uganda. Another change not unaccounted for could be related to urbanisation: it is likely that population growth rates have increased in the past decade in urban areas, such as in the capital city, Kampala, and neighbouring districts as well as in smaller towns. Due to these reasons, using the flat growth rate of 3.2% to estimate the total population might be just as relevant as the first method in some locations, and has the advantage of being easy to interpret, since it accounts for more or less the natural growth of the population, while not considering an inter-district migration assumption.

139 UBOS, *Projections of Demographic Trends in Uganda, 2007-2017* (Kampala: UBOS, 2007), 21-22.

Once the total population estimated in 2010 is determined, after projection, the adult part of the population also needs to be estimated using the proportion of adults measured in 2002. However, this proportion is very much correlated to whether a place attracts or repels migrants. Given the major changes in migration patterns found in the last two decades in Uganda, it is likely that this proportion has also changed. The assumptions that both these measures are constant (growth rate and proportion of adults) makes it difficult to fully trust the UBOS population estimates in some parts of the country. Major discrepancies between population estimates and adult population found on voters' registers might point to areas where migration rates and patterns are likely to have changed and thus to inaccurate population estimates and not necessarily to inadequate voters registration which we were trying to address here.

In order to address the issue of unsatisfactory population estimates, we opted to use the two different sets of projections in order to compare and map out results when relating these projections to the number of voters found in the register.

Population Estimates and Registered Voters: Some Results

The districts for which the register shows inconsistencies using both population estimates were pointed out (Map 24). Maps 22 and 23 show the largest discrepancies are located in the north of the country and point, in the southern part of the country, to an almost systematic overestimation of the number of voters (or underestimation of the population?), this also happening in the case of urban areas, areas of oil exploration and areas adjacent to the international borders of Congo and Sudan. Map 24 shows the districts where large discrepancies were found with both estimates. Nwoya district has attracted recent in-migration and this could partly explain the high number of voters (in-migrants could be returnees from internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in northern Uganda). In the case of Buliisa, the high voters' figures might also be due to in-migrants, with workers and other people attracted by oil-related business prospects. Kampala and Wakiso are also on the higher side: urbanisation could have attracted more people than in the previous decade and thus, lead to an unexpectedly high

population growth rate. In Kyegegwa and Lyantonde, however, it is difficult to find any convincing migratory explanation to such a high number of voters.¹⁴⁰ On the lower side, Adjumani and Moyo are places where most of the Sudanese refugees (Sudanese citizens were estimated at 160,000 in 2002, whereas Kenyans, for instance, were only 35,000) were resettled, and from where they were supposed to have returned to Sudan in the past years. This outwards flux, unaccounted for in the population estimates, could explain the divergence and relatively low voter registration. Districts in northeastern Uganda also present a much lower voter figure than population estimates would suggest, but in the case of Kaabong, population figures are possibly inaccurate, having been statistically inferred in 2002 due to a general over-reporting of people.¹⁴¹ In Napak and Amudat, and generally speaking in the whole of northeastern Uganda, the mobility of people, especially across the Kenyan border in the case of Amudat, could be a cause of discrepancy between the register and population estimates.

Comparing these results (Map 24) to actual participation in the elections (Map 16) shows that, in some areas where high numbers of voters were registered, participation rates were rather low (in Kampala and Nwoya) whereas in others participation rates are rather high (Kyegegwa). Lower than average participation rates were found in the districts of northeastern Uganda where the number of registered voters was far below adult population estimates, which might point to a general disinterest in civic participation and difficulty experienced by the administration to reach people in that region, both during population data collection exercises (2002 Population Census) and electoral data updates during the process of voters display and more generally, during campaigning.

The comparison between population estimates and voter figures sheds light on cases of discrepancies. Some of them have likely explanations, which seem to have more to do with population estimates than with the register, others do not. And due to the nature of the data, the comparison is not very

140 Yet it can be noted that no election petition was accepted for these areas.

141 UBOS, *2002 Population and Housing Census: Administrative Report* (Kampala: UBOS, 2007), 103-104.

conclusive. Yet if we except areas where patterns of mobility are difficult to assess (such as Karamoja), cases of over-representation appear in the west. It is difficult to be more precise in the absence of recent population data. It is worth noting that once the 2014 population census has been conducted and its results released to the public, it will be possible to gain a clearer and more detailed picture of possible inconsistencies in the number of registered voters, and this at the lowest level. In conclusion, although this analysis shows that population was misrepresented in some parts of the country, as shown by very contrasting results in the quality of local representation, in the absolute sense, it is difficult to assess the exact extent of the phenomenon or to link it to the process of registration itself.

To add to our analysis of possible distortions in the vote we turn to the discussion of electoral results themselves and to the election day and vote count.

Discontent with the Vote

Local contestations of the vote during and after elections constitute yet another dimension to be explored in order to assess the impact of possible fraud on the quality of the election results produced, highlighting distortions during the vote itself, and the vote count. Voicing discontent was not always the most obvious response on the part of voters, candidates and electoral agents alike, especially not in cases where intimidation might occur. Yet the judicial system has made efforts to handle complaints in a free and fair way. For the voters, discontent can result in non-participation; for the candidates, discontent was expressed through electoral petitions. These were to be submitted shortly after the elections. Some of the first rulings were appealed. It is worth noting that within the framework of election petitions, authors of fraud do not face criminal charges and can vie for elections again.

Many complaints of fraud were voiced from different places across the country on the day of elections and during the count. We start by mentioning some of the complaints that appeared in the press and other reports. Then we shall deal more specifically with the election petitions following the vote.

“Free and Fair” Elections

The vote was conducted under close surveillance. Local administration and security enforcers, generally siding with the NRM, stood in the voting areas. Due to strong territorial control, mostly in rural areas but also to some extent in residential neighbourhoods in towns, some of these officials actually knew most of their constituents. Opposition agents were present but not always in a position to ensure the neutrality of the vote.¹⁴² Various testimonies point to the presidential vote as being more strictly controlled than the parliamentary elections. The actual vote, using a wide-open basin to tick the list of candidates on an A4-size piece of paper cut half lengthwise with, for the presidential candidates, Besigye’s name on the first line and Museveni on the last did not do much to provide confidentiality.¹⁴³ Individual efforts to keep the vote secret could be viewed as attempts to conceal a vote in favour of the opposition. All in all, control or social pressure at the polling station might have resulted in higher results for Museveni throughout the country, and especially in places where the opposition was weak and unable to counterbalance incumbency.

One of the most common problems all over the country was finding the polling station where the register holding your name was located (this happened in 60% of the polling stations visited by the EUEOM). There were a number of disenfranchised voters due to this tedious process.¹⁴⁴ Did this account for low participation in Kampala and surrounding areas? One might ask whether this was due to a disorganised vote or to deliberate sabotage in one of the main opposition areas. In some marginal cases, 2% according to the EUEOM report, people were permitted to vote even though their names were not found on the register. This might have been used to repair perceived wrong, but it might also have been used for rigging.

142 It can be noted that NRM agents were generally more numerous (EUEOM, *Uganda. Final Report*, 37) and that the EU observers witnessed the arrest of opposition agents only (Ibid., 15).

143 Ibid., 46.

144 Ibid., 37.

Electoral Petitions and Court Cases

Accounts of possible fraud are found in petitions filed against election results. About 100 petitions were heard by the judiciary system, concerning both local and parliamentary elections.¹⁴⁵ Since the 2011 elections, a number of by-elections have taken place. With the exception of the recent Usuk (Katakwi District) by-election, which was not related to an electoral petition, all were due to the nullification of election results.

Map 25 shows the outcome of the election petitions concerning constituency MPs at the beginning of October 2012, one year and a half after the elections.¹⁴⁶ Out of 56 election petitions, 42 were rapidly dismissed or withdrawn. One actually led to an arbitration in favour of the rival candidate, an opposition MP, Moses Kasibante in Rubaga North, without new polls; the other 13 led to the nullification of the elections. Some candidates decided to file appeals against these decisions. In the end, six MPs retained their seats following this procedure, all of them in eastern Uganda (in Kagoma, Bukooli Island, Kibuku and Bubulo West, where the NRM candidates were reinstated, as well as in West Budama South and Ngora, where the independent and FDC candidates, respectively, kept their seats), and six by-elections were held, leading to four changes (Jinja East in Eastern, Bukoto South, Butambala in Central and Bushenyi-Ishaka Municipality in southern Uganda, all shifted to the opposition), and two reelections (Entebbe Municipality and Busiro North, in Central Uganda, where a DP and an NRM candidate were chosen respectively). Out of 112 district representatives there were 11 petitions following the Woman MP elections (Map 26). By October 2012, four had been nullified (Tororo in eastern, Luweero in central and Kaseese and Buliisa in western Uganda). In two cases by-elections were held (Kaseese and Luweero), leading to a change to DP in the case of Luweero. FDC retained its seat in Kaseese. In Tororo, the State Minister for lands appealed the nullification decision and won the case, thus retaining her seat. One case concerned the Youth MP elections (the Youth MP for western Uganda), but it was dismissed.

145 Anthony Wesaka, "Judiciary Begins Hearing of Over 100 Election Petitions," *Daily Monitor*, 16 May 2011, 6.

146 Through Internet sources (the press, radio, civil society organisations' websites, etc.).

Conclusion

In this paper we have presented and tried to critically assess electoral results by producing and analysing electoral maps. The major lesson learnt from this work is that maps showing electoral results should not be taken at face value. It is possible, when commenting on results, and especially when they are graphic, to forget the way they were produced and their limitations. Without questioning the validity of electoral results produced, we started by comparing electoral results at different levels, noting the dissociation between presidential and parliamentary vote and trying to delineate NRM and opposition strongholds. The NRM won at all levels in the west, defining the regime's strong base. On the shores of Lake Victoria the NRM power base was eroded. Museveni's gain in the north was mapped out, yet participation was relatively lower in that part of the country. Outside Museveni's western base, some of the NRM strongholds corresponded to constituencies with a below-average number of voters, which means that some of the NRM-delineated "strongholds" are a kind of misrepresentation. The massive shift towards NRM in the votes expressed could be the result of a combination of factors, with contrasting intensities throughout the country: a positive appreciation of the work done by the government in the previous years, a strong incentive to vote for the NRM for other reasons, ranging from fear to monetary gain, indifference, or a strong deterrent to take part in the vote. The vote in favour of President Museveni in opposition strongholds was correlated with low voter turnout, suggesting a vote under surveillance or a degree of mistrust in the electoral process. Parliamentary elections appeared to be less centrally controlled than the presidential vote.

It was not our aim to ascertain fraud, yet we were able to look at possible distortions in results purporting to be representative. We managed to establish distortions related to territorial control at large and more specifically to boundary delimitations and choice of electoral units. The apparent progression of NRM and parliamentary gains between 2006 and 2011 were directly related to gerrymandering. Woman MP and LC5 votes by district amounted to a plebiscite for the NRM (over 75% of the vote in favour of the party). It was noted, in the case of the Woman MP vote, that using districts as electoral units contributed to strong inequalities in representation.

This suggests that the overall makeup of Parliament and the differentiation between several categories of MPs (mainstream, Woman, “Special interest”), each using specific constituencies, is rather unconventional and favoured incumbency.


The shortcomings of the electoral process led to a certain amount of uncertainty regarding election results themselves. Defining electoral areas, reaching out to voters, the general conduct of the vote and vote counting, each one of these steps creates biases and even, in some cases, serious inequalities in the representation of an electorate. Commenting on results, without taking into account the way they were produced, reflects faith in an institution rather than an effort to grasp reality.

We reviewed the impact of electoral boundaries and creation of new districts on the vote, we also examined whether the registry reflected the total adult population and finally we tried to understand what might influence the outcome of the vote itself during elections. Concerning distortions linked to the registration of voters, we found no proof or conclusions about fraud from looking at population data. Yet inaccuracies in registries, in handling registries, and efforts to present results in favour of one candidate or another were documented in the press.


To conclude, we note that results in a large number of locations all over the country present at least one reason to question the quality of the electoral data published (Map 27). In some instances the participation rates were suspiciously high or low, in others the number of registered voters was really far from the adult population estimated in both scenarios used in this paper. We leave the task of establishing fraud to the judicial system and opt to represent the extent of the publicly contested vote by mapping out petitions against electoral results that provide an indication of the discontent of at least one candidate regarding the electoral process. Looking at the country as whole and considering different elements that point to unsatisfactory results and the surge for legal redress, about half the country was found to be in areas where strong distortions in the representation of the people were found and/or the vote was publicly contested.

Maps

Map 1: 2011 Districts




Map 2: 2011 Constituencies




Presidential election results


Map 3: 2011 Presidential elections: First-place candidate and party per district




Map 4: 2011 Presidential elections: Proportion of votes for Yoweri Museveni (NRM) per district



Map 5: 2006-2011 Presidential elections: Proportion of votes gained or lost by Yoweri Museveni (NRM) between 2006 and 2011 per district




Map 6: 2006-2011 Presidential elections: Proportion of votes gained or lost by Kizza Besigye (FDC) between 2006 and 2011 per district




Parliamentary election results


Map 7: 2011 Parliamentary elections: Political party of the elected MPs per constituency




Map 8: 2006-2011 Parliamentary elections: NRM gains and losses per constituency




Map 9: 2006-2011 Parliamentary elections: Opposition parties' gains and losses per constituency




Map 10: 2011 Parliamentary elections: Political party of the Woman MPs per district




Map 11: 2006-2011 Parliamentary elections (Woman MPs): NRM gains and losses per district



Map 12: 2006-2011 Parliamentary elections (Woman MPs): Opposition parties' gains and losses per district




Map 13: 2011 Local Council elections: Political party of the LC5 chairman per district




NRM and opposition strongholds in 2011

Map 14: 2011 Presidential, parliamentary and Local Council elections: NRM strongholds




Map 15: 2011 Presidential, parliamentary and Local Council elections: Opposition strongholds




Participation

Map 16: 2011 Presidential and parliamentary elections: Participation per district




New districts, new constituencies and electoral gains


Map 17: 2006-2011 Creation of new constituencies and 2006 registered voters




Map 18: 2006-2011 Parliamentary elections: NRM gains and losses in the constituencies split during the period 2006 to 2011




Map 19: 2006-2011 Creation of new districts and 2006 registered voters



Map 20: 2006-2011 Presidential elections: Proportion of votes gained or lost by Yoweri Museveni (NRM) between 2006 and 2011 in the districts split during that period




Map 21: 2006-2011 Parliamentary elections (Woman MPs): NRM gains and losses in the districts split during the period 2006 to 2011




The voters' register and population estimates


Map 22: Presidential and parliamentary elections: Proportion of the population registered on electoral lists (with UBOS population estimates for 2010, using 1991-2002 population growth defined at district level)



Map 23: 2011 Presidential and parliamentary elections: Proportion of the population registered on electoral lists (with uniform population growth of 3.2% p.a. throughout the country)




Map 24: Presidential and parliamentary elections: Districts where discrepancies between number of registered voters and adult population estimates appear with both estimates (uniform and district-level growth rates)




Dissatisfaction with the electoral process and court cases


Map 25: 2011 Constituency MP election follow-up, October 2012: Petitions and by-elections



Map 26: 2011 Women MP election follow-up, October 2012: Petitions and by-elections



Map 27: 2011 Presidential and parliamentary elections: Constituencies and districts with questionable electoral data



Notes on the maps

Map 2

Some of the constituencies were created recently (see also Map 17). Municipal boundaries were worked out from written descriptions of the parishes, counties or sub-counties included in the municipality. Some were easy, limited to a town council (Ntungamo), others more difficult to map, especially in the cases of Bushenyi, Kasese, Masindi and Rukungiri, which include town councils but are not limited to them. The case of Bushenyi Municipality is specific, since it includes both Bushenyi and Ishaka Town Councils, respectively located in the former Igara West and Igara East constituencies. This is the only case of creation of a constituency from pieces carved out from two former constituencies. One constituency (in both 2006 and 2011) was formed from two disjoint polygons: Erute North, in Lira District.

Maps 7, 8, 9

The political party taken into account for 2006 is the party of the candidate declared the winner after elections, not necessarily the party of the MP of the constituency at the beginning of 2011. In the case of Mukono North, for instance, the NRM candidate was declared the winner in 2006, but after an electoral petition that led to a by-election in 2010, DP candidate Betty Nambooze managed to get the seat. In 2011, Betty Nambooze was elected, this time in Mukono Municipality, and the rest of the former Mukono North constituency, still bearing that name, fell under a new NRM representative. Therefore, whereas the change between 2006 and 2011 took place in the area of the municipality (From NRM to DP), the political change linked to the 2011 elections, on the contrary, concerned the rest of Mukono North (From DP to NRM).

Map 17

As a consequence of the discontinuity of Erute North constituency, whenever the constituencies are labelled, the labels appear twice on Erute North: once on Lira Sub-County, west of Lira Municipality, and once in the centre of the main part of Erute North. When the labels are population figures (Map 17), they refer to the whole constituency (e.g. “35” appears twice, but that does not mean there are 70 000 voters).

Map 19

At first, in 2006, the former Arua District was split into Arua and Maracha-Terego Districts (also called Nyadri District) and then, following complaints from Terego county to the east of Maracha, the boundary was changed in 2010 and Terego became part of Arua again.

Map 23

To allow a margin of error on the growth rates, we decided to only point out the cases where voter figures outnumber both population estimates by 20%, or where voters represent less than 60% of the population estimates. As this is a very wide bracket, Map 23 highlights extreme cases only.